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Abstract 
The 2016 EU Global Strategy and the 2015 ENP review have made stabilisation of the 
ENP area one of their main priorities. Our argument here, however, is that the Global 
Strategy and the ENP review not only seek to mitigate the numerous crises currently 
affecting the neighbourhood. They also aim to address a set of intra-EU vulnerabilities 
linked to events in the ENP area that are threatening the EU’s own ontological security. 
We employ narrative analysis to explore how insecurity in the EU and in the ENP area 
is affecting the EU’s relation to the neighbourhood-other and its understanding of the 
EU-self. Our main findings point to that the Global Strategy and the ENP review 
provide ample measures to stabilise the neighbourhood. However, whether they have 
provided a sufficiently compelling narrative to enable the emergence of new 
emotional structures for the EU and its member states to make sense of themselves 
and their relation to the neighbourhood-other remains an open question.   
Keywords: EU – neighbourhood – crises – ontological security – narratives – self/other 
 
The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) review have made peace and stability in the ENP area a strategic priority.1 The 
predominant perception within the EU is that the eastern and southern 
neighbourhoods seemingly have gone from one crisis to the next since 2011. In the 
east, the conflict in Ukraine has not only caused armed clashes and territorial 
truncation, but also strong turbulence in other parts of Eastern Europe. In the southern 
neighbourhood, the conflict in Syria and the turmoil in post-Qaddafi Libya have added 
to the EU’s trepidations about its neighbours due to the escalating violence, the rise of 
Islamic State, and the large refugee flows affecting Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Turkey. The predominant perception in Brussels and many member states is therefore 
that ‘[t]oday’s neighbourhood is less stable than it was ten years ago’ (EC/EEAS, 2015a; 
European Parliament, 2015). Consequently, one of the principal document coming out 
of the 2015 ENP review, the Joint Communication on the Review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, makes clear that in ‘the next three to five years, the most 
urgent challenge in many parts of the neighbourhood is stabilisation’ (EC/EEAS, 
2015b).  
The push for stability in the neighbourhood is, nevertheless, not only due to the 
numerous crises affecting the ENP area. Insecurity, directly or indirectly linked to the 
neighbourhood, has also had concrete spill-over effects on the EU and its member 
states. Many EU member states have either become host or transit countries for 
refugee flows from the ENP area, reportedly the largest displacements of people in 
Europe since the Second World War (European Commission, 2016). The Nordic and the 
Baltic member states have become increasingly concerned over Russian military build-
up close to their borders and violations of their airspace. Terrorist acts in EU member 
states committed by individuals or commandos, some with ties to Al Qaeda or the 
Islamic State, have increased. All these events have generated a strong sense of 
physical insecurity in EU member states. The events have also had a destabilising effect 
on internal EU dynamics and routines. The EU and the European integration project is 
increasingly coming under fire as some EU members are questioning EU solutions to 
current security problems, forfeiting on concrete facets of the European construction 
in the name of defending national interests and territory, or challenging the values 
that underpin EU security agency. The destabilisation of the eastern and southern 
neighbourhood has, in other words, upset the narrative of the European integration 
and arguably, on a deeper level, the EU’s ontological security. The currently priority 
placed on stabilising the neighbourhood is, consequently, as much about dealing with 
the manifold crises related to the neighbourhood as stabilising the EU’s ‘sense of self’.  
This article will analyse the EU’s current existential crisis and its aim to re-
establish ontological security in and through the neighbourhood by ways of narrative 
analysis (Somers, 1994; Patterson and Monroe, 1998). We have reviewed over 60 
official documents, speeches, academic literature and newspaper reports in the period 
spanning 2004 and 2017 to uncover how EU political elite and supporting epistemic 
community narrate the EU-self and the neighbourhood-other. The article will proceed 
in the following manner. The first section outlines the conceptual framework. The 
second section draws up the contours of the ontologically secure EU in the early days 
of the ENP and contrasts it to the EU’s current unsettled sense of self. The final section 
explores how the EU is attempting to reformulate new narratives for the dual purpose 
of stabilising the neighbourhood-other as well as stabilising an EU’s ontologically 
insecure self.  
 
Ontological (in)security and narratives  
 
Ontological security refers to the efforts of an actor to safeguard the survival or 
persistence of a sense of self in contexts of recurrent uncertainty (Laing, 1960/1990; 
Giddens, 1991). The key premise of the ontological security literature is that all actors 
instinctively strive for ‘biographical continuity’, to ensure stability of self’s existence as 
well as confidence in its agency and social interactions (Giddens, 1991). In 
International Relations the ontological security scholarship has centred on scrutinising 
how ‘individuals, societies and states make sense of themselves and the world around 
them’ through the creation of stable ‘spatial and temporal emotional structures’ e.g. 
habits, routines and predictable intersubjective relations (Kinnvall, 2016: 5). The 
dominant consensus emerging from such research has been that the primary means by 
actors locate their spatio-temporal situatedness in the world is through narratives 
(Giddens, 1991; Ringmar, 2002). Narratives are constellations of related discourses 
constituted by causal emplotment – i.e. the arranging of select events in a logical, 
coherent order – through which we ‘come to be who we are (however ephemeral, 
multiple, and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) 
in social narratives’ sometimes, but not always, of ‘our own making’ (Somers, 1994: 
606). In social theory, the purpose of the narrative is, in other words, to provide a 
social or political collective with a compelling ‘plot’ or storyline of the origin and 
evolution of ‘we’ as a community, communal aspirational goals, as well as features 
uniting ‘us’ as members of the group, (Berenskoetter, 2014; Mälksoo, 2015; Subotić, 
2016). The main agents of such emplotment are social and political leaders that 
consciously mobilise compelling stories about the collective self. Our focus here will be 
on how the EU as a political community – and specifically the EU’s political elite and 
supporting epistemic community – deploys emplotted narratives as ontological 
reference points for drawing up the outer boundaries of the EU’s subjectivity and 
thereby provide the means to interpret and act upon collective experiences in an 
uncertain world.  
An issue which has become a matter of some debate among ontological 
security scholars is whether the collective storyline of ‘us’ emerges as a product of 
mostly reflexive (intra-group) or relational (inter-group) narratives. To some authors 
collective self-narratives are essentially reflexive, i.e. rooted within the social collective 
and based on selected group experience and aspirations (Steele, 2008; Berenskoetter, 
2014; Subotić, 2016). Such narratives generally sort different collective experiences 
into structures of meaning in view of offering the community a biographical continuity 
based on visions of ‘past-self’ and ‘future-self’ with relatively little reference to outside 
events or actors (Steele, 2008). Ontological security is thus secured through a stable 
intra-group self-narrative maintaining a consistent link between ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
self. Other authors take a different perspective and focus on individual and collective 
self-narratives as primarily relational and a result of reiterative processes of interaction 
and performative practices with significant others. Mitzen (2006a: 354), for example, 
argues that state identities are ‘constituted and sustained by social relationships’ as 
opposed to ‘intrinsic properties of the states themselves’. Ringmar (2002: 118) echoes 
such views when affirming that ‘we need others to accept our descriptions of 
ourselves, [and] to recognise us as certain types of actors´. Here we side with the 
former set of literature in positing that the EU self-narrative is largely reflexive and 
self-referential. While we understand ‘the neighbourhood’ as an important element in 
the EU self-narrative, we will sustain that the reference to neighbourhood-otherness is 
not of an objective, socially exogenous other or a result of an interactive social 
relationship (socialisation). Our argument rests on that ‘the neighbourhood’ is a 
cognitively constructed other, conveniently, or even strategically, manufactured to 
assist the EU as a political community to make sense of itself in its pursuit of 
ontological security. This echoes Chernobrov’s (2016; see also Campbell, 1998) insight 
that narratives not only serve to provide a sense of self, but also a storyline of the 
‘imagined other’. The latter takes on the role as ‘a reservoir for any traits the self 
needs it to contain in order to affirm a continuous and positive self. Construction of 
[imagined] others can then be seen to contain an ontological need for a secure self-
concept’ (ibid. : 6). 
As we have seen, an ontologically secure self is dependent on stability of the 
self/other-narratives, habits of interaction among members as well as a communal 
‘we’-feeling that allow members to interpret the uncertainty of the world and act 
together (Giddens, 1991). Ontological insecurity, in contrast, occurs when the link tying 
the before-self and after-self narrative or routines are upset or broken. This may come 
about as a result of a major unsettling event (trauma). Natural or man-made traumatic 
events may uproot the established sense of self as they tend to ‘generate powerful 
emotions, such as a heightened sense of vulnerability and a dread of the unknown’ 
(Kinnvall, 2016: 10). Traumas or profound ontological crises occur when events 
exogenous or endogenous to the political community – e.g. intense economic crisis, 
major political turmoil or rapid sociocultural change – cannot be neatly placed into the 
sense of self-narrative because they represent a challenge to the political community’s 
routines, practices and/or the emotional bond that ties the group together (Mitzen, 
2006a).  
Ontological insecurity can also arise as a consequence of an erosion of basic 
trust system among community members. Basic trust within a social or political 
collective can be said to exist when individual members believe their partners are 
committed to the relationship and will act on what is best for the group even when the 
members’ individual self-interests diverge (Simpson, 2007). In such a context, positive 
intra-group frames of attributions, perception of safety and ‘we-feeling’ emerge, 
thereby enabling the routines underpinning collective agency. In contrast, basic trust 
falters when a member fails to honour the collective values, motives, goals held as 
central of the self-narrative or unilaterally acts in blatant disregard for the communal 
good. When the basic trust system in a political community unravels, the collective 
emotional ‘cocoon’ that safeguarded the group against an outside uncertain threat 
environment ruptures (Giddens, 1991). The disruption of erstwhile stable inter-
subjective expectations and routines undermines the capacity of the community 
(leaders) to provide continuity and consistency of the self-narrative holding the 
community together (Campbell, 1998). Members of the group as a result feel 
disoriented and ontologically insecure. A lack of basic trust, in other words, disables 
the collective’s ‘firewall against chaos’ and erodes the shared expectations and 
practices needed for the constant (re-)production of the ontological secure self-
narrative (Mitzen, 2006b: 274).  
Traumas and declining trust levels, whether taken independently or together, 
produce a sentiment of anxiety as the coherence of the community’s narrative and 
practices are perceived as threatened and destabilised. When combined, as we will see 
in the case of the EU, they come to form a ‘perfect storm’ with deeply unsettling 
effects on the community’s ontological security as ‘established structures of meaning 
fail to make sense’ (Rumelili, 2014: 10). To mitigate the felt anxiety, EU political elite 
have initiated a search for a new causal emplotment of ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
Collectives, as well as individuals, pursue different strategies to reduce 
ontological anxiety and to counter the perceived threats against the sense of self. The 
approach which has received most attention in the ontological security literature is 
processes of securitisation. Securitisation entails that actors opt to securitise referent 
objects, processes and/or actors by invoking enemy images of radical otherness and 
adopting extraordinary measures to regain ontological security, e.g. resurrecting 
national myths or embracing rigid self-identities (Rumelili, 2015; Mälksoo, 2015; 
Kinnvall, 2016).2 However, key to our argument is that securitisation might simply be 
one of several possible ways to offset ontological insecurity. Here we take up Browning 
and Joenniemi’s (2017) invitation to open up ontological security analysis to 
alternative pathways of anxiety mitigation.  
We will argue that the EU is trying to overcome its current ontological 
insecurity by the recourse to a re-articulation of the EU-self and the neighbourhood-
other narratives to replace those that have become upended due to the dual challenge 
of trauma and diminishing trust levels. To explore this re-articulation we draw from 
Huysmans (1998) discussion of the liminality of self/other in the form of the ‘stranger’. 
A stranger is a figure which is simultaneously resides inside and outside of society and 
for want of a firm inside-outside categorization represents ‘difference’ (Huysmans, 
1998). While an outside other is frequently conjured up in collective self-narrative to 
reinforce clear-cut distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Campbell, 1998), the figure of 
the stranger constitutes a conundrum for the communal self-narrative as it is 
simultaneously ‘us’ and ‘not-us’. Political communities dread the stranger as it 
challenges established self-narratives with its difference. The figure of the stranger 
renders palpable the anxiety caused by the uncertainty which lies outside the safe 
confines of routinised relations. The stranger, for its ambivalent sameness-yet-not, 
unsettles ‘the (modern) ordering activity which relies on reducing ambiguity and 
uncertainty by categorizing elements’ into binaries (e.g. friend/enemy) and thus upsets 
the activity of ordering so central to the communal sense of self (Huysmans, 1998: 
241). The political elite, aware of that the legitimacy of themselves as community 
leaders rest on their capacity to order social relations and of ‘making life intelligible’ 
(ibid. 243), are thus prompted to produce new compelling narratives about the 
collective self to neutralise the challenge of the stranger (Steele, 2008). As we will 
come back to below, the EU ontological security is currently seen as partly undermined 
by a set of different strangers (e.g. EU sceptics, unilateralists, illiberal forces, populists 
and EU citizens turned terrorists). In its efforts to counteract such challenges against 
the sense of EU-self, EU’s political leaders appear to have opted for re-articulating and 
thereby redrawing the discursive boundaries between EU-self and neighbourhood-
other. As we will have opportunity to come back to below, the new storyline indicates 
a tactical revaluation of the neighbourhood-other narrative whereby the latter 
becomes a positive ‘partner’ in EU anxiety mitigation pursuits. Moreover, the imagined 
neighbourhood-other is also narrated as a demandeur for ‘more EU’ and technocratic 
solutions, as well as currently in need of stabilisation for want of liberal values. This 
produces a suggestive plot whereby the imagined other is used as a rhetorical device 
by political leaders to gain control over a new, emergent EU self-narrative, try to 
discipline the stranger and defuse the challenge constituted by the latter.    
 
 
From ‘EU as secure’ to ‘EU under threat’  
 
The 2004 Eastern enlargement ushered in a need for the European Union to adapt its 
self-narrative to its new ‘we’ in relation to its enlarged borders and new neighbours. 
The European Security Strategy, the EUGS' predecessor, was one of the first 
documents to coherently articulate the post-enlargement EU sense of self vis-à-vis the 
neighbourhood. The Strategy starts off proclaiming that ‘Europe has never been so 
prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has 
given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history’ (ESS, 
2003). The new master narrative of the Europe-EU ‘we’ was that the EU perceived as 
stable and safe within what was to be its new and enlarged borders. This ‘EU as secure’ 
trope in part drew force from the narrative of the EU as a political space having 
overcome historical animosity among its member states through incremental, 
functionalist co-operation and de facto solidarity since the early days of European 
integration. The EU was stable and secure because post-sovereign and technocratic 
joint solutions to political problems, and their accompanying consensus-based 
deliberative processes, had over time acted to defuse political tensions and generate 
basic trust among the political elite of the member states (Mitzen, 2006b). 
‘Independent’, ‘unilateral’ or ‘national’ action by the member states was simply no 
longer considered ‘attractive or ‘feasible’ in the context of European integration 
(Aggestam, 2004: 242). The ‘EU as secure’ narrative also drew strength from the idea 
that the EU stood for a certain set of values. The Eastern enlargement process, in 
particular, had contributed to the EU self-narrative as a liberal value community 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001). The European Security Strategy narrated the link between 
values and security as stemming from how Central and Eastern European 
‘authoritarian regimes’ had changed into ‘secure, stable and dynamic democracies’ as 
a consequence of the lure of EU membership. The EU’s export of liberal values beyond 
its borders was thus central to achieving ‘the vision of a united and peaceful continent’ 
(ESS, 2003). Moreover, as a liberal value community, the EU not only benefitted from 
stabilising influence on the prospective EU member states, but also from stable and 
predictable relations among members inside EU institutions. Liberal values were hence 
central in the ‘EU as secure’ sense of self as they generated emotional cohesiveness 
and trust among EU member states.  
The neighbourhood-other, in contrast, was held in the European Security 
Strategy and the EU narrative more broadly as ‘troubled’. The eastern neighbours were 
perceived in the mid-2000s as in the throes of several deep-seated political and 
economic problems as well as affected by frozen conflicts (ESS, 2003). The European 
Commission’s (2004) first Strategy Paper on the ENP depicts the Eastern European 
countries as wrought by ‘a history of autocratic and non-democratic governance and 
poor records in protecting human rights and freedom of the individual’. In the south, 
the Mediterranean neighbours were portrayed as home to endemic and ‘serious 
problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts’ (ESS, 2003). 
However, although recognised as profound, the problems inherent to the ENP area 
were not viewed as substantially affecting the EU, its member states and/or the 
European integration process at large at the time. The EU’s reading of the troubles in 
the ENP area was that the locus of both the sources of insecurity and their effects were 
confined to neighbouring countries and hence not constituting a challenge to the ‘EU 
as secure’ narrative (ESS 2003; European Commission 2004). Indeed, the EU’s 
narration of the neighbourhood-other in these years can be seen as a form of ‘gated 
community syndrome’, whereby ‘Fortress Europe’ was perceived so stable and 
internally secure precisely due to its discursive move to highlight the existence of 
insecurity beyond its borders (Zaiotti, 2007). The ontologically secure EU in the mid-
2000s was thus clearly constituted though the boundaries drawn between the 
narrated ‘we’ and ‘troubled-neighbours-as-other’ whereby the presence or absence of 
violence, post-sovereign functionalist practices and liberal values acted as markers for 
the emplotted intersubjective dividing line.  
The ‘EU as secure’ narrative has, however, slowly come undone in the 
aftermath of the Arab uprisings and ensuing crises in the ENP area. This is in part a 
consequence of the perceived growth of scale and scope of insecurity in the 
neighbourhood (trauma) in recent years and the fact that the effects of such insecurity 
no longer stops at the moot of Fortress Europe. However, the ‘EU as secure’ sense of 
self has also succumbed to a number of endogenous challenges which have dented 
basic trust among member states and in the European construction. 
As far as the exogenous challenges, the post-2011 EU narration of the 
neighbourhood-other points to intensified turbulence. The European Commission 
(2014) in one of its annual regional ENP Progress Report referred in particularly to 
2013 as ‘a year of crises’ owing to 
political instability and continuing difficult socio-economic conditions across a 
number of countries in the neighbourhood. Security challenges — both 
domestic and regional — increased and, in some countries, partly reversed 
democratic reform achievements of previous years and stunted prospects for 
economic recovery.  
The sources of the perceived insecurity are multiple. The ENP Review Communication 
articulates the view that ‘[i]n the East, an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy 
has resulted in the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity’ (EC/EEAS, 2015b). The ENP Review also notes the negative knock-on effect of 
the Crimean crisis on other Eastern European countries’ domestic contexts, their 
relations with Russia, and the ‘protracted conflicts’ that ‘continue to hamper 
development in the region’ (EC/EEA,S 2015b). In the southern neighbourhood, the 
Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) sustains that  
conflict, rising extremism and terrorism, human rights violations and other 
challenges to international law, and economic upheaval have resulted in major 
refugee flows. These have left their marks across North Africa and the Middle 
East, with the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings and the rise of ISIL/Da'esh (ibid.).  
The dimensions of neighbouring countries’ troubles have thus escalated in the EU’s 
neighbourhood-other narrative in recent years. The perceived growing uncertainty 
beyond its borders has produced an acute sense of vulnerability in the EU and its 
member states. The trauma caused by the scale and scope of destabilisation of the 
ENP countries has caused Commissioner for the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn (2015) to quip that the EU today increasingly 
appears to be surrounded by a ‘ring of fire’. 
Yet another trauma contributing to the EU’s current existential anxiety is the 
vanishing notion that neighbourhood instability can be neatly kept at bay by the 
external borders of the European Union. The European Council (2014) frets in 
particular over ‘the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the Islamist-
extremist export of terrorism on which it is based’ which to the EU political elite 
represents the most ‘direct threat to the security of the European countries’. On its 
hand the ENP Review Communication finds that in regards to refugees, migration and 
terrorism ‘the EU's own interdependence with its neighbours has been placed in sharp 
focus’ in recent years (EC/EEAS, 2015b). The 2015 European Agenda on Security warns 
that interdependence means that security threats are no longer ‘confined by the 
borders of the EU’ (European Commission, 2015). Commissioner Hahn (2015) has 
expressed concern that these new challenges entail that the EU currently is ‘importing 
instability’. The erstwhile ‘EU as secure’ narrative, in which Fortress Europe was 
depicted as safe as uncertainty and threats were contained by its borders, has in other 
words become destabilised. This has generated anxiety and dread as the limes 
separating the new EU (in)security space from the ENP (in)security space have 
progressively been blurred.  
The ‘EU as secure’ emplotment has also in part lost credibility due to a set of 
endogenous challenges as some EU member governments – and some citizens – are 
increasingly unwilling or unable to uphold the ontological reference points related to 
post-sovereign functionalist practices and liberal values which have so far underpinned 
the EU ‘we’ as a political community. The Syrian refugee crisis, for example, has 
unleashed a set of intra-EU contentions which testify to a loss of faith among member 
states in each other as well as joint, post-sovereign, technocratic solutions to common 
security problems. A first example is the divided reaction to the European 
Commission’s 2015 proposal to managing the refugee flow through an asylum 
relocation proposal. The proposal was based on the functionalist principle that all EU 
member states would be under an obligation to take in a pre-determined and 
weighted quota of refugees. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia 
disapproved of the Commission’s plans as they alleged technical and financial 
problems and not wanting to share responsibility for refugees essentially heading for 
Germany or Sweden. Their opposition was later overruled as the relocation proposal 
was passed by the EU Council in September 2015 by an unprecedented recourse to a 
qualified majority vote, rather than the Council’s habitual reliance on consensus. This 
procedural change deepened the central European member states’ grievances as they 
perceive the vote being instrumentalised as a means of political coercion against them 
(Taylor, 2015). They have since refused to honour the agreement, alleging Commission 
intrusion into an area of exclusive member state competency as well as expressing 
unease over how the Council vote side-stepped the standard consensus-based, 
deliberative processes that had been characteristic of the EU in the past. A second 
example of loss of trust among member states and in post-sovereign, technocratic 
solutions is the imbroglio over the Schengen system. As the refugee crisis deepened in 
2015 a number of member states began to unilaterally reinstate national border 
controls, with Germany and France leading the way. These member states argued that 
national border controls were needed as they no longer have confidence that EU 
external borders are efficiently managed. To try to remedy the situation the European 
Commission began to elaborate a proposal in late 2015 for creating of the European 
Border and Coast guard agency to replace the existing FRONTEX. The early versions of 
the Commission’s initiative nevertheless quickly became controversial among member 
states. Sweden, Poland and Slovakia, for their different reasons, voiced concerns over 
being presented with what they perceived as yet another technocratic proposal that 
overstepped the Commission’s competencies (de la Baume, 2015). The apprehension 
about the Commission’s role in the context of the asylum and border initiatives 
prompted the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) to issue 
a joint statement expressing their conviction that ‘[t]he institutions of the European 
Union need to stick to their missions and mandates’ (Czech Republic Government, 
2016). Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán (2017) has been especially vocal in his 
critique of post-sovereign and technocratic approaches, arguing that the EU ‘has 
avoided dealing realistically with [migration and border] threats; instead, it crafts 
policies that concentrate on formulating “European solutions” that solve nothing’. To 
his mind it is time to abandon technocratic solutions crafted by EU institutions, stating 
‘[f]or decades, the mainstream answer to European problems was “more Europe.” We 
have to recognize, however, that there are areas where we need more Europe and 
areas where we need less Europe’. The erstwhile stable understanding among EU 
member states of the EU as the optimal site for technocratic management and 
consensus-based deliberative processes has thus been upset by the refugee crisis. 
Moreover, the Schengen member states’ current national-first, unilateral-style action, 
as opposed to joint EU post-sovereign solutions, is also contributing to the 
destabilisation of the ‘EU as secure’ narrative. It renders the stranger within the 
political community, and the latter’s lack of commitment to erstwhile self-narratives 
and habits of interaction, visible.  
A different endogenous challenge linked to the neighbourhood undermining 
the EU’s ontological security is the fact that the narrative of EU’s liberal values as a 
bulwark for peace and security has become unsettled. Most notably some EU member 
states have suffered attacks of terrorism committed by individuals or groups propelled 
by radical ideologies. European leaders have tended to interpret such acts as an 
affront to the values the EU holds central, such as solidarity, freedom, including 
freedom of expression, pluralism, democracy, tolerance and human dignity (European 
Council, 2015). However, these same values are currently facing a crisis of legitimacy 
on two levels. There is a crisis of legitimacy at the domestic level in some of the 
affected member states as many terrorist acts have been committed by EU citizens 
turned against their countries and co-citizens, thereby casting a shadow over the state 
of implementation of such values in contemporary EU societies in the face of social 
marginalisation and political radicalisation (Lyons-Padilla, et al., 2015). The HRVP 
Federica Mogherini (2015) recognises this when she contends that  
[f]ighting Dae’sh and other extremist groups is […] also about what we do right 
here at home.[...] It is about helping young people find good jobs, and finding a 
place in our societies for those who feel alienated and left out. It’s about 
sending a message of unity, of belonging, of inclusion.  
Moreover, a different crisis of legitimacy stemming from the rise of terrorism, 
especially Al Qaeda and Islamic State-linked terrorism, is the emboldened rhetoric of 
the growing number of xenophobic and populist parties all across the EU seeing liberal 
values as an obstacle to security. Poland’s interior minister Mariusz Blaszczak, member 
of the populist Law and Justice party, has indicated that the surge of terrorist deeds in 
the EU in recent years is an unfortunate outcome of EU’s ‘policy of multi-culturalism 
and political correctness’ (FT, 2016). Viktor Orbán – who has avowed to make Hungary 
an ‘illiberal democracy’ – has derided the EU as ‘weak’ and ‘defenceless’ on terrorism 
due to its liberal values, arguing that ‘the European spirit and its people believe in 
superficial and secondary things: in human rights, progress, openness, new kinds of 
family and tolerance’ when security should be prioritised (Government of Hungary, 
2015). These political leaders, similarly to most xenophobic and populist parties in 
Europe whether in government or in opposition, therefore defend the necessity to 
establish new value models within their national contexts, as well as in the EU, to 
ensure security for citizens. European Council president Donald Tusk has expressed 
concern over such challenges to the EU’s liberal democratic values since to his mind 
the ‘[l]oyalty to these values remains not only a precondition for the coherence of our 
community […] Anyone who weakens these values will, in effect, lead to the 
weakening our security sooner or later’ (European Council, 2016). The dual crisis of 
legitimacy on values is thus destabilising the ‘EU as secure’ self-narrative. The 
challenge of ‘difference’ produced by the stranger – whether EU-citizens turned 
terrorists or illiberal populists – weakens the moral certitude of the EU as the principal 
security referent for the community, and contributes to a dilution of the communal 
‘we’-feeling among EU member states.  
In sum, in the context of multiple and interlinked crises and growing instability 
in the EU’s neighbourhood, the EU’s ontological security is being conditioned by a 
series of traumas and by declining levels of trust among EU member states and faith in 
EU institutions. The erstwhile stable structures of meaning and depictions of the world 
inherent in the EU self-narrative appear no longer to fulfil their purpose and have 
prompted many observers to fear for the future of the EU and the European 
integration. The EU Global Strategy voices this concern in stating that ‘[w]e live in 
times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under 
threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and 
democracy, is being questioned’ (EUGS, 2016: 13).  
 
Stabilising the ‘neighbourhood’… and the EU self? 
 
The EU self-narrative of ‘EU as secure’ has, as we have seen, reached a critical juncture 
as longstanding ontological reference points have become void of their past meaning. 
Given the current existential anxiety within the EU, it is unsurprising that the political, 
economic and security stabilisation of the neighbourhood ‘the main political priority 
for the European Union (EU) in the next years’ (Council of Ministers, 2015). Naturally 
the EUGS and the ENP review, and their accompanying EU Communications, 
predominantly focus on concrete instruments to stabilise ENP partner countries. 
However, an attentive reading of the documents also reveal proposals for a new EU 
self-narrative to overcome traumas and boost the current low levels of basic trust 
among member states and for European Union institutions and hint at a burgeoning 
redefinition of the neighbourhood-other. 
First, in terms of stabilising the neighbourhood the EU's accent has most 
notably been placed on directly addressing the instability by making ENP countries 
more ‘resilient’ against threats they currently experience (EC/EEAS, 2015b; EUGS, 
2016). This has in part meant a narrative whereby traditional EU external action and 
common foreign and security policy instruments are marshalled to provide 
neighbouring countries with the ability ‘to withstand, adapt and quickly recover from 
stresses and shocks’ in areas of ‘[p]overty, inequality, a perceived sense of injustice, 
corruption, weak economic and social development and lack of opportunity, 
particularly for young people’ (EC/EEAS, 2017a; EC/EEAS, 2015b). Furthermore, the 
stabilising discourse draws upon earlier tropes in the EU foreign and security policy 
narratives by reprioritising staples of earlier editions of the ENP as more urgent after 
the ENP review such as, for example, resolving the various protracted conflicts in the 
neighbourhood, enabling security sector reform, mitigate organised crime as well as 
cyber threats. The ENP review’s primary goal is thus to provide a causal emplotment of 
the measures that have been or will be taken in the short to medium term in order to 
reduce the intra-EU anxiety prompted by the trauma caused by the exogenous change.  
However, there is also a re-articulation of the self/other narrative in the 
relevant documents in recognition of that ‘the EU and its member states are subject to 
many of the [same] structural pressures that test the resilience and expose 
vulnerabilities of our partner countries’ (EC/EEAS, 2017a). The powerful image of 
Fortress Europe immune to the insecurity beyond its borders has thus shifted into an 
emergent narrative of ‘[w]e [the EU] have learnt the lesson: my neighbour’s and my 
partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses’ (EUSG, 2016). The depiction of an ‘EU 
as insecure’, vulnerable, in need of ‘protection’, together with the notion that there is 
a need to search for ‘resilience within our borders’ (EC/EEAS, 2017a) narratively places 
the EU in a similar predicament as neighbouring countries. The intersubjective 
separation of EU ‘we’ and the imagined neighbourhood-other, that used to run along 
the outer border of Fortress Europe, has after the 2015 ENP review been replaced with 
a narrative based on a shared EU-ENP (in)security space. The merger of the EU-ENP 
(in)security space has also had further implications for the self/other narrative. The 
ENP Review Communication warns ‘[t]he EU cannot alone solve the many challenges 
of the region, and there are limits to its leverage’. The Communication therefore calls 
for ‘[p]roactive engagement with partners in the neighbourhood’ in order ‘to address 
root causes of cross-border threats and to contribute to securing common borders’ 
(EC/EEAS, 2015b). The Council of Ministers (2015) has on their hand advocated for ‘the 
need to empower and enable partners’ prevent and manage crises alongside the EU on 
a range of security-related issues. The EU in this way arguably tries to shift the 
neighbourhood-other from being mere passive locations of troubles to become 
authorised agents and valued collaborators in EU-ENP stability production. Such 
narratives attribute the neighbourhood-other a greater protagonist role in security 
provision and co-responsibility for managing the EU-ENP security order. This is 
especially visible in the areas of migration and terrorism. The EU priority of tackling 
irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling migration is understood as only 
manageable ‘in partnership with the countries of origin and transit of migrants’ 
(EC/EEAS, 2017b). On terrorism the EUGS declares that ‘terrorism and violence plague 
North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself’ and the EU will therefore 
develop ‘anti-terrorism cooperation with North Africa, the Middle East, the Western 
Balkans and Turkey' (EUGS, 2016: 7ff). We argue here that this new EU self-narrative of 
the EU as vulnerable and in need of its neighbours’ help is a first step in the process of 
mitigating ontological anxiety produced by trauma. The re-articulation of self/other 
narratives, whereby erstwhile hierarchical modes of discourse (superior/inferior) are 
flattened out and replaced with more egalitarian narratives, most obviously reduces 
the self-anxiety stemming from the antagonistic difference when subject positions 
were further apart. The erstwhile threatening other becomes less menacing as it is 
reconceptualised an ‘almost-self’, with shared concerns and as holding perceived 
potential (however unwarranted) for security provision.3  
The revaluation of the other may also help to neutralise the perceived threat of 
the stranger within the political community. As we have seen, post-sovereign, 
technocratic solutions to security problems have increasingly come under fire within 
the EU and calls for ‘less Europe’ has become common place. However, such narratives 
have been countered in the ENP review’s and the EUGS’ emplotment of the 
neighbouring countries as demanding ‘more Europe’ and as worthy of more 
implications from the EU in providing stability for the EU-ENP area (EC/EEAS, 2015a). 
The EUGS (2016) affirms that the ‘[u]nder the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
many people wish to build closer relations with the Union: our enduring power of 
attraction can spur transformation in these countries’. As a consequence of such 
demands the compelling EU narrative becomes that the EU must take responsibility 
and engage with its deserving neighbourhood-other. ‘Less Europe’ is not an option for 
those in the EU political elite who believe that the EU cannot simply ‘pull up a 
drawbridge to ward off external threats’ (ibid.). Rather, it is contended that, ‘[t]o 
promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, 
we will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it 
brings about, by engaging the wider world’ (ibid.). The ENP Review Communication 
also offers a way to overcome the intra-EU aversion to technocratic approaches by 
arguing in favour of greater direct implication by the Council and the member states in 
identifying ENP priorities and in supporting their implementation (EC/EEAS, 2015b). 
The EU thus proposes replacing the erstwhile technocratic sense of self with a 
narrative where the EU becomes a more member state-led enterprise in its dealings 
with the neighbourhood.  
The altered neighbourhood-other narrative can also serve to discipline the 
stranger within the political community. The Report on the Implementation on the ENP 
Review (EC/EEAS, 2017b) paints the picture that the ‘EU's own stability is founded on 
good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, and promotion of reforms 
in these areas is key to the ENP's objective of stabilisation’. There is thus an implicit 
self-narrative that internal EU stability is intimately linked with EU’s liberal values, 
which in turn could be read as an effort to discipline individual member states into 
upholding these values in their own domestic jurisdictions. However, such disciplinary 
practices to stabilise the EU’s self-narrative have not yielded much result. It is indeed 
in the terrain of stability and values the EUGS and ENP review’s attempt to provide 
new ontological reference points is more tentative. There are indications that the 
contentions among member states related to the EU’s liberal values conditioned the 
drafting of the Review Communications. The Staff Paper, accompanying the ENP 
Review Communication, revealed that ‘[s]everal Member States, think tanks, and 
business community stakeholders indicated that a better balance needs to be found 
between promoting values and interests (including stability and security in the 
neighbourhood)’ (EC/HRVP, 2015). Such affirmations appear to indicate that there was 
no shared and unconditional faith among all stakeholders that EU’s liberal value-
promotion in the ENP area has in the past been conducive to stability. Commissioner 
Hahn (2015) have thus advocated for a more pragmatic, less forceful, approach to 
values in the ENP area and a stronger expression of a yet to be defined set of EU 
‘objectives and interests’. The EUGS calls this 'principled pragmatism', signalling a 
discursive shift away from liberal values toward a value-cum-‘EU interest’, to guide 
agency on EU-ENP stabilisation. This is a potential new, if nebulous, ontological 
reference point around which to construct a narrative to counteract the national 
Eurosceptic, populist and isolationist political forces that is currently questioning the 
EU’s liberal values, while simultaneously catering to defenders of such values. The 
value-cum-EU interest trope can therefore be said to aim to project new temporal and 
spatial emotional structures around which the EU and its member states can re-situate 
their future EU ‘we’ in a changing EU-ENP security environment. However, the 
weakness of the principled pragmatism narrative is that it so ambiguously sits on the 
fence between liberal and illiberal preferences. As a consequence, it has so far failed to 
provide the basis for establishing new habits of interaction and fomenting the ‘we-
feeling’ needed for an ontologically secure EU foreign and security policy agency. What 
is more, it is clear that such ambiguity has inevitably dented the legitimacy for and 
moral certitude of the narrative of the EU as a liberal value community able to project 
its values both within and beyond its borders.  
In sum, the (in)security in the EU-ENP area has unsettled longstanding existing 
intersubjective boundaries between the EU-self and the neighbourhood-other and 
caused ontological insecurity within the EU and its member states. To attempt to 
remedy (at least part of) the existential anxiety the EU’s political elite has tried to 
endow the EU-self and the imagined neighbourhood-other with new storylines to 
overcome anxiety and to neutralise the challenge of the stranger. The EU’s political 
leadership clearly hope that such new narratives will help reduce the felt impact of 
current EU-ENP (in)security traumas and reverse declining trust levels as ‘[f]orging 
unity as Europeans – across institutions, states and peoples – has never been so vital 
nor so urgent. Never has our unity been so challenged’ (EUSG, 2016: 16).    
 
Conclusions 
 
The EU is currently suffering from a bout of ontological insecurity. The changing 
security environment in the ENP area and a faltering commitment to erstwhile 
narratives of EU integration process have caused members of the EU political 
community to question what the EU ‘we’ is today. EU officials, member states and 
citizens feel vulnerable due to diverse traumas related to the proliferation of crises in 
ENP countries and the EU’s inability to hold insecurity at bay by its borders. EU 
officials, member states and citizens also perceive vulnerability because of key aspects 
of the European integration process, such as post-sovereign technocratic, joint and 
consensus-based solutions to problems as well as liberal values, are increasingly being 
challenged. The healthy basic trust system that has underpinned the EU’s foreign and 
security policy in the last decade has thus begun to erode, a trend that arguably have 
been further accelerated by the 2016 Brexit vote. The EUGS and the 2015 ENP review, 
and their accompanying documents, can for this reason be read as attempts to show 
actorness on problems affecting the neighbourhood-other as well as re-scripting an EU 
self-narrative and of the neighbourhood-other in hopes that it will permit the EU and 
its member states to re-establish ontological security. Whether the EUSG and the ENP 
review together provide sufficiently compelling narratives to enable the emergence of 
new stable emotional structures for the EU and its member states to make sense of 
EU-self in relation to the neighbourhood-other, and thus mitigate ontological 
insecurity, remains an open question. 
 Our study also makes a contribution to the debates in the International 
Relations literature of how emotions matter in specific social or political 
circumstances. Our use of the concept of ontological (in)security here has helped us 
highlight that emotions are fundamental to how threats and vulnerability are 
interpreted by a political community. Ontologically secure actors are able to face and 
cope with uncertainty in a different way than the ontologically insecure. If a political 
community is confident in its own temporal and spatial situatedness, its reaction to 
insecurity will be muted. Under certain circumstances the community might even act 
to disregard and/or perpetuate insecurity, if it might perceive uncertainty as conducive 
to its own overall symbolic and institutional order and/or international narrative (e.g. 
'EU as secure'). In contrast, the ontologically and emotionally insecure actor will react 
to insecurity wishing to transform it. This might involve a radicalisation of self-other 
difference (securitization) or, as in our EU-ENP case, the articulation of alternative 
narratives designed to establish new self-other routines and to neutralise the stranger 
in order to reconstitute the political community’s joint emotional governance.  
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1 The ENP is the EU’s umbrella policy for all major political and socioeconomic initiatives directed towards the 
eastern and southern neighbourhood. The ‘ENP area’ encompasses all the countries included in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
2 We hold that securitisation processes is not applicable in our case study as the EU political elite have 
opted not to draw a clear discursive line between self and a radical other. Securitisation, in essence, 
relies on a ‘discourse of exclusion’ and ‘turning the stranger into an enemy’-other (Kinnvall, 2004: 754). 
In our discussion of the ‘stranger’ we note that by definition it is neither fully self nor other, hence it 
would be difficult to make the stranger subject to securitization prior to being ‘expulsed’ from the self 
and re-narrated as a radical other.  
3 We believe that the re-articulation of the neighbourhood-other narrative is simply a discursive move, 
which does not correspond to any empirical verifiable improvements in neighbouring partners’ security 
provision capability.  
